Posts Tagged ‘ DTO’s ’

Countering system disruptions: concepts and lessons

In MXSECURITY we have constantly warned about the increasing threat of system disruption techniques by Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs).

On May 17th, we pointed out that DTOs could eventually target critical urban infrastructure such as electric power lines, communication hubs or key highways in Mexico’s major cities.

By then DTOs had already disrupted large cities such as Monterrey or even Mexico City, by blocking the cities’ main highways with barricades. However, as we then said, the complexity of the system disruption techniques used by the drug gangs would eventually increase.

In Monterrey for instance, DTOs have started to attack electric power hubs as a clear intent to cause major blackouts. It is not yet clear if these attacks have been successful so far, since local authorities have remained silent on this topic. Nevertheless, similar reports have emerged in the neighboring state of Tamaulipas, where drug gangs related to Los Zetas organization are believed to have caused major damages to small-sized electric stations.

We should not ask ourselves if these attacks will get more complex in the upcoming future –they certainly will, but how can local governments effectively tackle them.

During the past week, local and state authorities in Monterrey announced the creation of the so called “anti-blockade enforcement groups”, comprised of state and municipal policemen with helicopter support. The idea is not bad at all; however since local police forces are deeply corrupted by DTOs, the success of the entire anti-blockade strategy is yet to be seen.

Perhaps local authorities should look at international experiences were criminal syndicates have used similar system disruption tactics.

Sao Paulo, Brazil could be a good example.

During 2006 the Primeiro Comando da Capital, or PCC (First Command of the Capital), a Brazilian criminal syndicate that first started to control local penitentiaries and then moved to a wider scope of illegal activities, attacked the city of Sao Paulo. The PCC hijacked public transport buses and burned them in the middle of the city’s main highways. Schools and government buildings were closed, transportation was halted and several banks robbed.

Throughout several days, Sao Paulo experienced a series of system disruption attacks that collapsed its entire economic and social life.

Lessons drawn from this experience point out two main operational concepts regarding the PCC’s capabilities:

Mobility: The PCC used small commandos that simultaneously committed the attacks, making it harder to police forces to respond.

Network-centric communications: The gang-style commandos did not use different communication systems. Instead they communicated with each other and received orders by cell phone. It’s been said that police forces in Sao Paulo did use different communication channels -radios with diverse frequencies- that further complicated their response.

While the PCC had an agile and “networked structure”, police forces were disperse.

In regard to system disruption tactics, the Sao Paulo experience shows us that police and military forces must have a clear command-and-control structure, operate under a network-centric communications system and assure mobility (active helicopter support instead of a passive one).

The anti-blockade enforcement groups created in Monterrey should learn from the Sao Paulo experience. It is not enough to assemble such groups if they don’t operate under a comprehensive, network-centric strategy.

If these anti-blockade groups operate with different communication systems, lack a clear command-and-control structure and have a passive helicopter support, they’ll simply fail

Local police forces’ transformation: the missing link in countering organized crime.

Since President Calderon arrived to Office in late 2006, he made it clear that his government’s top priority would be to tackle Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO´s). His first executive order in the matter was to send thousands of soldiers to the western state of Michoacán, then the hot spot of DTO’s related violence.

In the coming months, the Federal Government kept sending military, navy and police units to embattled zones such as Baja California, Durango, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas.

The main objective of such troop deployments was simple: to regain control of DTO’s-controlled areas and bring them under the “rule of law”.

Nevertheless some politicians and even policy makers confused –deliberately or not- the “tactical objective” with the long term strategy, which required a wider approach beyond military operations.

Yet this misunderstanding is still part of the public debate for two main reasons: first, the Federal Government has failed to explain the general strategy correctly and, on the other hand, some politicians use this apparent confusion to avoid their share of responsibility in the “war on drugs”. And this is what I call “the missing link”.

Let me explain what I consider the core strategy and how some politicians –mostly governors- are evading their role in it.

The core strategy, although complex in its details, is comprised of three main phases:

1. Tactical Objective:

To regain control of geographic areas embattled by Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime syndicates.  Given the operational capabilities needed to back this phase, the Government would use military personnel while transforming the Federal Police into a well-capable force.

2. Mid-Term Objective:

Once the Federal Police is ready to replace the Armed Forces, the military would assume a “back-up” role participating only in special, surgical operations. This phase requires that the Federal Police has undertaken a deep modernization process, regarding not only its hardware equipment but also its operational procedures, intelligence and anti-corruption capabilities.

3. Long-Term Objective:

While military forces are performing a “back-up role” for the whole strategy, and the Federal Police is in charge of tackling organized crime, it is time for the local authorities to undertake a serious transformation to their local police and judicial forces.  

Yet to achieve this Long-Term Objective, the general strategy requires a full commitment of state governors and their security apparatus. And this is precisely the “missing link” I was talking about.

There are two main actions that state authorities must carry out as part of the general strategy: to modernize their local police forces (creating a single state police force) and to reform the judicial apparatus towards verbal, transparent and more effective procedures.  

With some exceptions, the bulk of state governors are simply not endorsing these actions. Why? Well, if they do modernize their police and judicial structures, they will simply lose control over them.

The state governors’ unwillingness to assume a more active role in the general strategy against organized crime is serious and very dangerous.  

Let’s put it this way: should local police and judicial forces remain unchanged, organized crime will establish its stronghold under the safe haven of state authorities.

The success of the general strategy against DTO’s depends on the state governor’s commitment, and not only the Federal Authorities’ one.

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